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The Polish Question: 
an Apple of Discord between Napoleon 
Bonaparte and Alexander I
“Poland was not worth
a single drop of French blood”
Talleyrand1
Poles and Napoleon. Polish legions
In time of the Napoleonic era, the Polish Question occupied an important 
place in the policy of the Great European Powers. The problem of Poland as 
a factor in international relations arose in Europe during the partitions of 
that country between the three powers – Prussia, Austria and Russia at the 
end of the 18th century.2 However, the erasure of Poland from the maps of 
Europe did not solve the Polish Problem, more to the contrary; growing pa-
triotism of Polish aristocracy and intelligentsia revived and vigorously re-
minded to European statesmen this matter of fact. 
Many prominent Polish politicians who were active during the 
Kościuszko’s Uprising in 1794 became the backbone of Polish politics, both 
home and abroad, in the beginning of the 19th century. Hopes of these Poles 
were set above all upon to French. They believed that revolutionary France 
1) S. ASKENAZY, Napoleon a Polska, Warszawa 1918, vol. II, p. 123. 
2) See to the Partitions of Poland, H. KAPLAN, The fi rst Partition of Poland, New York 1962; H. 
R. LORD, The Second partition of Poland, New York 1913; T CEGIELSKI, L. KĄDZIELA, Roz-
biory Polski 1772–1793–1795, Warszawa 1990; V. SAUTIN, The First Partition of Poland, in: 
Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, Prague 2009, pp. 119–143.
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and its allies would come to the aid of Poland because they both had the 
same enemies: Austria, Prussia and Imperial Russia.
For the French government the Polish Question was not the key 
problem in the external political activity, but it attracted Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s attention as early as the end of the 18th century and during the 
period of 1806-1812 with the expansion of the French Empire to the East, the 
role of the Polish problem in French external aff airs and diplomacy was al-
ready quite signifi cant. 
The fi rst time Napoleon Bonaparte turned to the Polish problem 
was in 1795 when the Poles submitted to him a project that called for the 
creation of Polish military units or legions composed of Émigré and Poles 
who had deserted from the armies that were opposing France.3 Bonaparte, 
himself kindled the hopes of the Polish patriots relative to French help in 
the restoration of their country. He spoke to his adjutant, the Pole Józef 
Sułkowsky: “I love the Poles and attach great importance to them. The partiti-
on of Poland was an unfair act that does not have the right to become a perma-
nent state of aff airs. After the conclusion of the hostilities in Italy, I will go my-
self at the head of the French to defeat Russia and restore Poland. But the Poles 
must not count on foreign help alone, they must arm themselves...with pretty 
words alone nothing can be accomplished. A nation destroyed by its neigh-
bors must take up arms itself.”4
However it was only in the 1797 that the French government 
agreed to the off er of the Poles and agreed to the creation of Polish Legions. 
In December 1796, polish general and poet Jozef Wybicki persuaded the 
leaders of the Directory to form the fi rst auxiliary Polish legion in Italy.5 
Formally the Poles were accepted into service not by France but by the Re-
public of Lombardy, newly created by French bayonets. In 1797 the fi rst 
Polish Legion was formed in Milan under the Command of Jan Henryk 
3) J. L. PACHOŃSKI, Legiony polskie. Prawda i legenda, Warszawa 1969, vol. I. p. 213. 
4) M. OGINSKI, Memuary, St. Petersburg 1916, II, pp. 229–230.
5) W. ZAJEWSKI, Wybicki znany i nieznany, in: Z epoki Legionów i Mazurka Dąbrowskiego, 
(ed.) by W. Śladkowski, Lublin 2000, pp. 167–179.
Dąbrowski.6 His Manifesto addressed to Poles, and published in Italian, 
French and German periodicals, elicited a great response from the Polish 
émigré community. Soon Milan began to fi ll up with scores of volunteers in 
spite of the penalties enforced by the partitioning powers. The volunteers 
included patriotic émigrés as well as Polish prisoners released from the 
Austrian army. Within a short time, the Polish general gathered seven 
thousand potential troops, whom he turned into a disciplined army. They 
wore Polish uniforms, Italian epaulettes and French cockades, and mar-
ched to a song written by Jozef Wybicki which in the twentieth century 
became the Polish National Anthem. 
In 1798, at Napoleon’s instigation, Dąbrowski’s Legion was soon 
joined by two more: in Italy by a second Polish legion under General Jozef 
Zajączek (1752–1826) and in Germany in 1800 by the Légion du Rhin under 
General Karol Kniaziewicz (1762–1842). The Poles who fought in the legions 
believed that after liberating Italy from Austrian and Bourbon rule they 
would march through Hungary into Galicia, from where they would launch 
an insurrection in Poland.7 However, these hopes were not to be fulfi lled.
Napoleon never discussed his Polish plans except in the grandest of 
generalities, and conspicuously avoided any commitment which might have 
cramped his freedom of political action. It is signifi cant that Kościuszko, who 
lived in Paris after his release from Russia in 1796, fi rmly refused to associate 
himself with any of Napoleon’s schemes. “Do not think”, he said, “that Bonapar-
6)  Jan Henryk Dąbrowski (1755–1818) was born and grew up in Electorate of Saxony, where 
his father served as a Colonel. He joined the Saxon army in 1770 and returned to Poland in 
1791, when the Polish Four-Year Sejm recalled all Poles serving abroad to the Polish army. 
As a cavalryman educated in a Dresden military school he was asked to reform the Polish 
cavalry. Under Poniatowski, he took part in the campaign of 1792 against the Russians. He 
was in Poland in 1794 when the Kościuszko Insurrection erupted. He took an active part in 
the uprising, defending Warsaw and leading an army corps in support of a rising in Great-
er Poland. Thanks to his courage and military skills the Supreme Commander of the Na-
tional Armed Forces promoted him to the rank of general. After the collapse of the upris-
ing, he was off ered commissions in the Russian and Prussian armies, but chose to fi ght for 
Poland. Dąbrowski is more famous as the organiser of Polish Legions in Italy during the 
Napoleonic Wars, after which he bacame a Polish hero. See G. ZYCH, J. H. Dąbrowski, Wars-
zawa 1964; J. PACHOŃSKI, General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski, Warszawa 1972. 
7)  T. RAWSKI, Legiony Dąbrowskiego-pierwsze vojsko polskie na obczyźnie, in: Z epoki Legi-
onów i Mazurka Dąbrowskiego, (ed.) by W. Śladkowski, Lublin 2000, pp. 9–45. 
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In the meantime, those Poles who abandoned all thoughts of a Na-
poleonic rescue turned their visions to the Russia. In St. Petersburg right at 
that time, foreign policy fell into the control of a Polish nobleman, Prince 
Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, who was laying plans of his own for the restoration 
of a united Poland under the aegis of the new Tsar, Alexander I.
Alexander I and Adam Czartoryski and their Polish policy
Alexander I (1801–1825), in time of his accession for the throne in 1801, an-
nounced that he would follow in the footsteps of Catherine the Great. His Po-
lish policy, however, proved to be in the opposite direction to that of his il-
lustrious grandmother. It could not be otherwise, for the teaching of the Swiss 
liberal, Frederick La Harpe, and the friendship of one of the greatest Polish 
patriot of his generation, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, had a profound ef-
fect on the character and policies of the young, impressionable monarch.
Under the 1794 Kościuszko’s Uprising, Prince Adam Czartoryski 
(1770–1861), together with his younger brother Constantine, became politi-
cal hostages and resided at Catherine’s court in St. Petersburg, thus assur-
ing the good behaviour of their father Adam Kazimierz.12 In return the Em-
press allowed the Czartoryski’s family to retain its huge ancestral estates. 
Prince Adam, who was appointed aide-de-camp (personal assistant) to the 
Grand Duke Alexander, soon became the latter’s most intimate friend and 
confi dant.13 However, his friendship with Alexander and, even more, with 
the Grand Duchess Elizabeth, aroused the suspicion of Emperor Paul (1796–
1801), who exiled Czartoryski (1799) to Italy by appointing him Russian 
minister to the dethroned King of Sardinia.14 There he remained until the 
12)  Prince Adam Casimir Czartoryski (1731–1823) cousin of the polish king Stanislaw Ponia-
towski, was governor-general of Podolia and proprietor of estates cultivated by more than 
40,000 peasants. He builded the famous palace at Puławy.
13)  Young Alexander spent hours in the company of a small group of friends - Paul Stroganov, 
Nikolay Novosiltsev, and Adam Czartoryski – dreaming of the day when he would be able 
to put into practice the ideas with which his tutor La Harpe had inculcated him, i.e. to 
transform Russia into a constitutional monarchy. See N.K. SCHILDER, Imperator Alexandr 
Pervyj, St. Petersburg, 1898, vol. III, pp. 477–483.
14)  M. BOBRZYNSKI, Dzieje Polski w zarysie, Warsaw 1931, III, p. 31; V. N. GOLOVINA, Zapiski 
grafi ni Varvary Nikolaevny Golovinoi, St. Petersburg 1900, pp. 72–73 and 76.
te will restore Poland. He thinks only of himself. He hates every great nationali-
ty, and still more the spirit of independence. He is a tyrant whose only aim is to 
satisfy his own ambitions. I am sure that he will create nothing durable.”8 With 
the assistance of his secretary, Józef Pawlikowski (1767–1829), Kościuszko com-
posed the famous pamphlet entitled “Can the Poles win their Independence?” 
In it, he argued that the captive nation could not count on the support of Fran-
ce or of any other foreign power, but must rely exclusively on its own strength 
and resources.9 Kościuszko’s comments proved to be all too true. The Legions 
were never used for purposes related to polish independence. 
The First Legion was decimated by Suvorov at the battle of Trebbia 
in 1799; the second at Marengo in 1800; and the Legion du Rhin soon after-
wards at Hohenlinden. The reserves were posted to pacifi cation duties in 
occupied Italy, and in 1802–1803 were drafted with the expedition sent to 
crush the rebellion of Negro slaves on Santo Domingo. Men who had volun-
teered for service in the Legions in the hope of liberating Poland found 
themselves fi ghting in the Caribbean as the instruments of colonial repres-
sion. They died in their thousands from swamp fever before a handful of 
survivors surrendered to the British. Of the 6,000 men who took part in this 
expedition, only 600 survived.10 Disillusionment was general. 
In 1801 at Lunéville, Napoleon made peace with his enemies and 
all agitation on the Polish Question was abruptly terminated. Moreover, Na-
poleon promised Russia and Austria that he would not sponsor the Émi-
gré’s and would not help them in their eff orts, which were directed against 
the existing order in their territories. This disposition was aimed fi rst of all 
against the royalists but also had the Poles in mind. Many felt let down by 
Bonaparte and betrayed by France, but this was not to be the end of the Pol-
ish Napoleonic dream. Napoleon Bonaparte, wiping out regardless the fron-
tiers of Europe, could not fail to capture the imagination of these men, tens 
of thousands of whom would answer his call again and follow him despite 
his repeated callous betrayal of their cause.11 
8) B. SZYNDLER, Kościuszko a Napoleon I, in: Z epoki Legionów i Mazurka Dąbrowskiego, (ed.) 
by W. Śladkowski, Lublin 2000, pp. 107–137.
9) Ibid., p. 112.
10)  See J. PACHONSKI, R. K. WILSON, Poland’s Caribbean Tragedy: A Study of Polish Legions in 
the Haitian War of Independence 1802–1803, Columbie, 1986, pp. 46–53.
11)  E. I. FEDOSOVA. The Polish Question in the External Policy of the First Empire in France, 
Moscow, 1980, p. 76. 
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der could not restore the kingdom of Poland, he was instrumental in preser-
ving and perpetuating the language and culture of the Poles. 
Poles were appointed as heads of the Universities of Kharkov and 
Wilno and the Krzemieniec Lyceum, which became the centers of Polish 
learning and literature. Czartoryski was placed in charge of education in the 
former Polish territories, so-called eight ‘Western Gubernias’ of the Empire 
from 1803 to 1823.20 Moreover, Czartoryski, already serving as assistant Fo-
reign Minister since 1802, was appointed head of the Foreign Offi  ce early in 
1804, following the retirement of Count Vorontsov. He occupied this post 
until June, 1806. Many leading Russians, suspicious of a Pole as Foreign Mi-
nister, were disapproved of his appointment, and Czartoryski had found 
many obstacles at the St. Petersburg’s court for providing his policy.21 
In the political system which Czartoryski endeavored to develop, 
he wanted Alexander to become the “arbiter of peace for the civilized 
world,” the “protector of the weak and oppressed,” and the “guardian of ju-
stice among nations.”22 Alexander’s reign should begin a new era in which 
the politics of Europe would henceforth be based upon the general good 
and the rights of the individual. Czartoryski never abandoned these ideas, 
but tried to give them practical application, and to have them accepted by 
the Tsar and his political leaders. 
Although his system, by its fundamental principle of “correcting 
all injustices,” naturally led to the re-establishment of Poland, Czartoryski 
had to avoid even the use of the name. Instead, he cleverly spoke only of the 
“progressive emancipation of peoples unjustly deprived of their political exi-
stence.” He mentioned the Greeks and the Slavs by name. The time was not 
yet ripe to speak of the Poles.23
Czartoryskis Mordplan wider Preussen in 1805
Not until 1805 were conditions at all favourable for more or less open considera-
tion of the Polish Question. This was at the time when negotiations lead up to 
20)  BOBRZYNSKI, III, p. 31; S. MENDELSOHN, Die Polenfrage im Zeitalter Napoleons und Alexander I, 
Berlin 1929, p. 31. 
21) SCHILDER, II, p. 122. 
22) Ibid., p. 125. 
23) KUKIEL, pp. 55–61.
murder of Paul and the accession of Alexander, who was not entirely inno-
cent of the death of his father. In a short urgent letter written within a week 
of his coming to power, the new Emperor summoned Czartoryski to return 
immediately to St. Petersburg.15 
The accession of Alexander and the return of Czartoryski had little 
immediate eff ect on the position of the Poles. Many of them now looked ho-
pefully towards Russia, instead of to France which had practically forsaken 
their cause, only to experience new disappointments. In a treaty (in October, 
1801) between France and Russia, for example, one the articles stipulated 
that neither country would protect or support any political refugees.16 Czar-
toryski regarded this as the only signifi cant article in the treaty and believed 
it was directed against his countrymen. When he complained to Alexander, 
the latter explained that the article had no real signifi cance, that it was pu-
rely a matter of form, and that the destinies of Poland were dear to him as 
ever.17 In the fi rst years of his reign Alexander talked of Poland at “more and 
more prolonged intervals,” returning this subject only to console Czartoryski 
whenever he found the latter. discouraged. Czartoryski, however, recognised 
the complexity of the Polish problem: “In his position what could he do? What 
could I reasonably demand?“ he asked rhetorically.18
He could not demand the restoration of Poland, for this did not 
depend on Alexander alone. But the amelioration of the lot of the Poles Was 
within the new Tsar’s power, and it was to the accomplishment of this end 
that, under Czartoryski’s guidance, he directed his eff orts. He liberated the 
Poles in Siberia and permitted those who were abroad to return without dif-
fi culty to their homeland. Wherever possible, he restored their confi scated 
properties. He appointed Poles to high administrative posts in the Polish 
provinces, previously occupied by Russians. He even intervened in behalf of 
Poles who were held prisoners by the other partitioning powers.19 If Alexan-
15)  Alexander to Czartoryski, 9. 3. 1801, in: Mémoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski et corre-
spondence avec l’empereur Alexandre Ier, by Ch. de MAZADE (ed.) Paris 1887, I, pp. 1–2.
16) M. KUKIEL, Czartoryski and European unity 1770–1861, Princeton 1955, pp. 41–60.
17) Mémories de Czartoryski, I, p.286. 
18) Ibid., 279–80. 
19)  Czartoryski persuaded Austrian government to free the most radical of the Polish revolu-
tionaries, for example Hugo Kołłątaj, who then settled in Russian Poland. See KUKIEL, 
p. 107.
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because he was detained by the Prussians in Warsaw. At Puławy, Alexander 
held fi nal conferences with Austrian envoys who, to the very end, hoped to 
dissuade him from carrying out his plans against Prussia. But Alexander 
informed them that he could no longer drawback: “We shall raise Poland 
against the Prussians, and, if I can give you Silesia, you may count on me.” 28 
Writing at this time to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Czartoryski re-
vealed that “His Majesty is fi rmly determined to begin the war against Prus-
sia.” He anticipated that the Russians would be received “with open arms,” 
because of the Polish hatred for Prussian domination.29 Preparations were, 
in fact, made for banquets and balls to take place following Alexander’s arri-
val in Warsaw and his proclamation as king of Poland. In the Old Town 
square the market women talked openly of coming events. “Your administra-
tion will not last long,” they are quoted as having said to the Prussian police 
offi  cers: “the Russians will come and we shall drive you out.”30
Suddenly and entirely unexpectedly Alexander announced that he 
would not go to Warsaw but to Berlin. Complete disillusionment dominated 
the Poles: there would be no invasion of Prussia; there would be no restorati-
on of the kingdom of Poland. Instead of waging war on Prussia, Alexander 
soon vowed eternal friendship for Frederick William III at the tomb of Fre-
derick the Great. What had happened?
Earlier Prince Peter Dolgoruki had been sent on secret assignment 
to Berlin and he had quickly fulfi lled his mission. While on his way to Puławy, 
Alexander had dispatched his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgoruki, to the Prussi-
an monarch in a fi nal attempt to persuade the latter to abandon the policy of 
neutrality. The envoy’s task at that very moment was greatly facilitated by 
Napoleon’s violation of Prussian neutrality in Ansbach. Frederick William 
became indignant and irritated. He at once gave Russian troops permission 
to pass through his territories, invited Alexander to Berlin, and concluded (3 
November, 1805) with Russia and Austria the treaty of alliance at Potsdam.31
Thus the Czartoryskis Mordplan wider Preussen was abandoned and 
hopes of Prince Czartoryski to rebuild Poland were vain. It should be pointed 
out, for example, that Prince Dolgoruki was a convinced enemy of Czartoryski 
28) SCHILDER, II, p. 135.
29) Ibis., p. 143.
30)  A. A. KORNILOV, Russkaja politika v Pol’she so vremen razdelov do nachala XX veka, St. Pe-
tersburg 1915, p.17. 
31) Grand Duke Nicholas Michailovich, Imperator Aleksandr I, St. Petersburg 1912, I, p. 17. 
way for the Third Coalition. While England, Austria, and Russia were able to 
agree on joint military action against Napoleon, Prussia persisted in her neutra-
lity. Without Prussia, the coalition would be much less powerful, for not only 
would Prussian troops be absent from among the allied armies, but Russian tro-
ops would be barred from passage through Prussian soil. Every eff ort was made, 
including the writing of personal letters by Alexander to Frederick William III 
and the off er of a 3 million pound-sterling British subsidy, to persuade the Prus-
sian king of the folly of his neutrality, but the latter remained adamant.24 
Czartoryski, who as Foreign Minister conducted the Russian nego-
tiations, regarded Prussian obstinacy with a certain degree of satisfaction. 
He actually had in mind to start the invasion of Prussia and to proclaim the 
Kingdom of Poland under the scepter of Alexander. 
Czartoryski’s plan, referred to by German historians as Czartoryskis 
Mordplan wider Freussen, had the approval of Russia’s allies. Austria, for ex-
ample, in the event of her losing Galicia, was to be compensated with Silesia 
and Bavaria.25 England, likewise, gave her consent to the restoration of Poland 
and even agreed to pay Russia the subsidy originally intended for Prussia.26
 With the diplomacy of the Third Coalition practically completed, 
Alexander set out for Puławy, the palatial residences of Czartoryski’s parents, 
where fi nal steps were to be taken for the invasion of Prussia and the regene-
ration of Poland. During his stay at Puławy the Tsar received and conferred 
with various Polish notables. Of the outstanding Polish leaders, only Joseph 
Poniatowski, nephew of the last king of Poland, did not appear.27 This was 
24) SCHILDER, II, p. 127.
25) See SCHILDER, II, pp. 129–30., KUKIEL. p. 61–67.
26) Ibid., p. 64.
27)  Jozef Anton Poniatowski (1763–1813), Polish Prince and Marshal of the French Empire 
(1813), was born in Vienna. The son of a high-ranking offi  cer in the Austrian army and 
a nephew of the last King of Poland, Poniatowski himself fought with the Austrians 
against the Turks intermittently from 1778 to 1788. From 1792 to 1794 he was in the Pol-
ish army fi ghting the Russians in the Ukraine but was later allowed to settle on the fam-
ily estates near Warsaw. Briefl y in 1806 he accepted offi  ce as Governor of Warsaw under 
the King of Prussia but he welcomed Napoleon’s invitation to command the fi rst Polish 
Legion of the Grande Arrnée in 1807 and became Minister of War in the Grand Duchy. He 
liberated Cracow from the Austrians in July 1809 and founded new military institutions 
around Warsaw. Napoleon gave him V Corps in the Grande Armée of 1812. See R. BIELICKI, 
Książe Józef Poniatowski, Warszawa 1974, pp. 25–31.
36
wbhr 02|2011
37
The Polish Question: an Apple of Discord between Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander I | 
Viktor Sautin
Balance of Power than of the wishes of the people. In 1805, the balance tip-
ped decisively in Napoleon’s favour. The French occupied Vienna. The Russi-
an army tramped across the Polish lands from end to end, only to be thorou-
ghly beaten with their Austrian allies at Austerlitz on 5 December. On 14 
October 1806, at Jena and Auerstadt, the Prussians were annihilated. Berlin 
was occupied. In November, Marshal Davout took Poznañ, whilst Marshal 
Murat entered Warsaw. The three partitioning powers were prostrate. 
Fallen Prussia lay at Napoleon’s feet. He achieved such military 
successes, the likes of which not one of his predecessors on the French thro-
ne could have dreamed about. However, the destruction of Russia did not 
bring about the end of the war. Russia continued to wage war and Napoleon 
realized that this new war would be more diffi  cult and bloody. In this situa-
tion, the use of Polish lands and Polish population became the military and 
political aim of the moment, and one of the ways to accomplish military vic-
tory over a threatening opponent.
In that case, Dąbrowski and Wybicki, the old campaigners, were 
persuaded to issue an “Appeal to the Polish Nation”. Zajączek set to forming 
yet another Northern Legion, Prince Józef Poniatowski, after much delibe-
ration, was persuaded to accept command of the new Polish forces. 
Napoleon’s fi rst visit to Warsaw on 19 December 1806 led to the formation 
of a Ruling Commission, headed by Stanisław Małachowski, former Presi-
dent of the “Great Sejm”. The fi rst act before a decisive showdown with the 
Russian army was to proclaim the coming military campaign of 1807 as the 
“Polish War,” the name itself had a double meaning, but very promising for 
the Poles, calculated to fi re up their patriotic feelings. While warming up 
the patriotic hopes of the Poles, Napoleon was speaking out about the fate of 
Poland itself in a meaningful but very careful way, mysteriously limiting 
himself to vague and conditional promises when he had to respond to en-
thusiastic calls from the Poles.36
In the bulletin of the Grande Armée dated December 1, 1806, he 
wrote: “Will a great people recover its existence and independence? Will it 
come back to life? Only God can resolve this great political problem.”37 It is like-
ly that at that time he did not have any well-defi ned plans towards a future 
Poland. Especially since at that very time Napoleon was beginning to think 
about peace and possibly an alliance with Russia. 
36) ASKENAZY, II, pp. 146–153.
37) FEDOSOVA, pp. 93–97.
and his whole political system, and was only too glad to undertake the secret 
mission to Berlin which he hoped would prove fatal to Czartoryski’s plans.32 In 
Berlin, he joined Maxim Maximovich Alopeus, the Russian ambassador, who 
had apparently been disregarding Czartoryski’s instructions regularly and 
who kept Berlin informed of Russia’s designs against Prussia.33 Although wil-
ling to support Russia, in return for adequate compensation, Austria prefer-
red to have Prussia in the allied camp rather than in that of Napoleon, and, 
therefore, urged the Tsar to avoid war “at all cost” with Frederick William. 
Alexander also realized that to strike a suffi  ciently strong blow against Napo-
leon, he needed to attach Prussia to the coalition rather than to make war 
upon her. In this instance, his Polish sentiments had less weight than his de-
termination to stop the growing strength of Napoleon.34
Despite the disillusionment of the majority of the Poles, the senti-
ments of many of the Russophiles remained unchanged. Czartoryski never 
lost faith in the sincerity of Alexander’s Polish sympathies, and even after 
he left the Foreign Offi  ce he continued to advise him on Polish aff airs. To-
wards the end of 1806, when the war of the Fourth Coalition was in full 
swing, the Prince believed there was still time, in fact, a real need, for the 
regeneration of Poland. Accordingly, he addressed to the Tsar a “Memoir on 
the necessity of re-establishing Poland to forestall Bonaparte.”35 In it he poin-
ted out the importance of Poland in the struggle which would determine 
the fate of Russia and of Europe. He warned that Napoleon would use the 
resources of Poland against Russia.
Napoleon’s victories over Fourth coalition and Treaty of Tilsit (1807) 
In the years 1806–1807, Polish aff airs were completely subordinated to the 
rivalry between Napoleon and the Russia (if you like Coalition). Any Polish 
state that was to be created would, of necessity, be an expression more of the 
32)  Author Schidler in his monograph relates that ‘on one occasion at the Tsar’s table Prince 
Dolgoruki became engaged in a heated argument with Prince Czartoryski and said to 
him: “You reason as a polish prince and I reason as a Russian Prince.” Czartoryski became 
pale and remained silent.’ SCHILDER, II, pp. 123–124.
33) S. ASKENAZY, p. 256. 
34) KORNILOV, p. 17. 
35) Mémoires de Czartoryski, II, pp. 148–58. 
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the French side nor the Russian had any concrete plan. In any case, there is 
no single document extant to outline either on the French or the Russian 
diplomatic side the possible resolution of the Polish question, on the eve of 
the Tilsit negotiations. It was an open fi eld for bargaining.41 
Curiously enough, it appears that each Emperor desired the other 
to take over the Prussian Polish provinces. “Napoleon asked me to take the 
Polish crown,” Alexander is quoted as having said, “but conditions prevented 
me from doing so.” Instead Alexander suggested that a Polish state be created 
with Prince Jerome at its head. He hoped thereby to preserve for Frederick 
William the left bank of the Elbe, where Napoleon already contemplated 
erecting the kingdom of Westphalia for his youngest brother.42 This propo-
sal was rejected by Napoleon for, with Jerome on the Polish throne, he feared 
friction would develop whenever the slightest problem arose between the 
Polish state and Russia.43 
It was fi nally decided to establish a new state, to be called the Du-
chy of Warsaw under the scepter of the King of Saxony, whose dynasty had 
ruled Poland in the 18th century. The new state was called a Duchy rather 
than a Kingdom out of deference to Austria and Russia. When the Poles pro-
tested against the choice of name, Napoleon replied like that: “Gentlemen, 
I have done more for you that you have a right to expect of me. It is out of defe-
rence to the neighbouring powers that I want you to take this name. It was the 
desire of the Tsar of Russia and I should not wish to fall out, over one word, 
with a sovereign whose friendship I seek.”44
 Alexander, anxious not to leave the peace negotiations empty-han-
ded and to establish a “natural frontier” between his own empire and the 
new Polish state, demanded and received the district of Białystok, the north-
easternmost portion of the Prussian Polish provinces.45 
The creation of the Duchy of Warsaw undoubtedly gave some advan-
tages to Napoleon. He received the means to exert pressure on Russia, Austria 
and Prussia and to keep them within the confi nes of the Tilsit treaty. The crea-
tion of this Duchy appeared to the Poles to signal the beginning of the rebirth 
41) See S. T. ROSS, The European Diplomatic History 1789–1815, Malabar, 1981, pp. 248–264. 
42) ASKENAZY, II, p. 213.
43) Ibid., p. 214.
44)  Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (SIRIO), St. Petersburg, 
1867–1916, LXXXIX, p. 74.
45) ASKENAZY, p. 216. 
The advance of French armies into Polish lands towards the end of 
1806 forced Bonaparte to return more often to the Polish Question. But even 
now the re-establishment of Poland as a nation did not enter into his plans. 
“Poland – that is a diffi  cult question - declared Napoleon at the end of 1806. The 
Polish nobility plays too great a role there, they allowed the partitions to take 
place, they ceased to be a people, they lack a public spirit. It is a corpse into 
which we have to breath life fi rst, before I can even think about what to do with 
it...I will bring forth from it soldiers, offi  cers and then I’ll see.”38 
The indecisive battle of Eylau (in February) and the Victory over the 
Russians at Friedland (in June) brought Napoleon to the Niemen, where he 
opened peace negotiations with Russia that resulted in the Treaty of Tilsit. 
In a conversation with Tsar Alexander‘s representative, Prince Lo-
banov-Rostovsky, on the eve of the Tilsit negotiations, Napoleon declared 
that the mutual interests of Russia and France dictated the necessity of an 
alliance between these two powers and underscored that the Vistula river 
must become a genuine and natural frontier of Russia.39 For Napoleon, the 
Polish Question was but an element in a diplomatic policy whose aim was to 
force Russia to join France against Britain, Austria and Russia. In this way, 
Napoleon already outlined in this conversation his program of a peace treaty 
and alliance with Russia, an idea that he contemplated for sometime which 
was based on a partition of continental Europe between France and Russia. 
There was no room left for other independent powers in Europe. And there 
was no room left for the Polish problem either. The territory of Poland was 
automatically divided along the Vistula between the two allies. It was a very 
simple program, quite advantageous to Napoleon, as he was to become the 
master of all Western and Central Europe. One of the most important ele-
ments of this program was to weaken Prussia, and to turn it into a country 
that had no serious role to play on the political arena.40 
The Russian emperor could not accept such a division of Europe. 
His aim was to preserve as much as possible the balance of power in Europe 
that existed before the war, and to preserve the old system of alliances, and 
for that it was important to keep Prussia as a more or less strong indepen-
dent nation. With regard to the fate of the Polish lands, as we see it, neither 
38) PACHONSKI, p. 246.
39)  Ibid., 247, or See Foreign policy of Russia XIX–XX century. Documents of the Russian Minis-
try of Foreign Aff airs, Ser. 1, T. 3, Moscow, 1962, p. 57.
40) A. PALMER, Alexander I, New York 1974, pp. 156–157.
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“simultaneously and with the best of harmony.” The French resident in War-
saw complained of the very problematic conduct of the Russians during the 
war.48 Nevertheless, when the campaign was over, Russia insisted on a voice 
in the peace arrangements, especially those touching the fi nal disposition of 
Galicia. Whereas Napoleon would attach Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw, 
Alexander would have Galicia either remain with Austria or become a part 
of the Russian Empire.
The negotiations over Galicia were long and controversial. In every 
increase in the size of the Duchy of Warsaw, Russia saw a threat to her own 
empire. The Russian Foreign Minister, Count Nicholas Rumiantsev (1807–
1814), made this clear to the French ambassador, Caulaincourt: “I support 
our alliance, but I believe it my duty to say to the Tsar that we should renounce 
our foreign policy and sacrifi ce the last man rather than suff er the enlarge-
ment of this Polish domain, because this is an attack on our own existence.”49 
To the Russians, every increase in the size of the Duchy meant a step in the 
direction of the revival of Poland and the possible loss by Russia of her Polish 
provinces. When Napoleon tried to reach a compromise by off ering territori-
al compensation to Russia, Alexander replied that “on the Polish Question 
there can be no compromise. The world is not large enough that we might be 
able to settle the aff airs of Poland if it is a question of her restoration in any 
manner whatsoever.”
Despite the protests of the Russians and their fear that the enlarge-
ment of the Duchy of Warsaw would soon lead to the rebirth of Poland, Napo-
leon insisted that the only possible disposition of Galicia was its cession to the 
Duchy. “The honour of France would be compromised if those Galicians who 
had served her were abandoned to the revenge of Austria. Further, justice 
would not permit the cession of Galicia to a Russia which had contributed 
nothing to its conquest.”50 Only after Napoleon suggested that Russia might 
receive Lvov, with something more, if Alexander fi nally would accept the 
principle of ceding Galicia to the Duchy of Warsav.51 Actually, due to the soli-
citations of Austria, Lvov, in the Treaty of Vienna (14 October, 1809), remained 
48)  J. STANLEY, The French Residents in the Duchy of Warsaw, 1807–1813, in: Canadian Slavon-
ic Papers, 1985, XXVII, 1, pp. 49–64.
49) PALMER, p. 247.
50) Ibid., p. 248.
51) SIRIO, XX1, p. 326. 
of the Polish nation, which tied them further to the French Emperor and made 
them into a weapon in his hands. The king of Saxony receiving now the title 
of “Grand Duke of Warsaw” was an ally and a vassal of Napoleon. 
Thus France acquired a vassal territory which could become the 
advance post for a new military campaign. The creation of the grand Duchy 
of Warsaw did not resolve the Polish problem - it was a temporary, shaky 
structure, of the same sort that had arisen several times during that tumul-
tuous epoch. Besides, the Tilsit peace treaty itself was not very stable a struc-
ture and encompassed within itself almost all the elements of a future war. 
The negotiations over Galicia and Russian “Treaty of Guarantee” 
Two years after Tilsit, war broke out again between France and Austria, and 
again Poland and Russia were involved: Poland, because of the insurrection 
in Galicia, and Russia, because of her alliance with France and her interest 
in the Polish problem. 
The war of 1809 brought about certain changes in the approach of 
Napoleon‘s government towards the Polish problem. During the course of the 
Franco-Austrian war, there arose a real crisis in the relations between France 
and Russia, and therefore in the whole system of international politics created 
by the Tilsit treaty and as a result the enlargement of the territory of the Du-
chy of Warsaw at the expense of Western Galicia which had been apportioned 
to Austria during the third partition of Poland (1795). On the eve of the 
Schoenbrunn peace treaty, the French Foreign Minister, Champagny, wrote 
to Napoleon: “Poland will begin its rebirth, all the course of the Vistula river 
will belong to the Duchy of Warsaw, both Polish capitals will be Polish again. 
Time will bring about the rest.”46 Champagny sketched this way, of course still 
in vague terms, a plan to create Poland a vassal state (no longer a small duchy) 
as a weapon of war in the event of a military confl ict with Russia.
Despite the terms of the alliance, Russia took no active part in the 
war.47 The Russian commander-in-chief refused to come to the relief of San-
domierz, besieged by Austria, although he and Poniatowski had agreed to act 
46) ASKENAZY, p. 235.
47)  Alexander informed Austria in advance that he would delay the entry of his troops into 
Galicia and that they would be instructed to avoid all collisions with the Austrian army. 
See SCHILDER, p. 356.
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Europe.”56 Napoleon, in turn, became angry with his eastern ally. “Does Rus-
sia want war?” he inquired. “Why these continuous complaints? Why these 
injurious suspicions? Does Russia wish to prepare me for her defection? I shall 
be at war with her the day she makes peace with England.“57
French and Russians plans regarding Poland on the Eve of the Franco-Rus-
sian war of 1812
In 1810, it was becoming apparent that the Tilsit system had outlived its 
course and that a new European war may start precisely in Eastern Europe. 
The French government began, apparently right after the war of 1809, to 
work out the details of a new course of their international policy and received 
a completed sketch of it in the report from Champagny. On March 16, 1810 he 
presented to Napoleon “a view of continental aff airs and the rapprochement 
between Russia and Great Britain”.58 The main idea of this report came down 
to this, that the alliance with Russia has entered its last phase - and that war 
was inevitable. In this sketch Champagny felt that Poland was one of the most 
faithful allies of France. Therefore in this report a proposition was brought 
forth that it is imperative to unite all the portions of Poland and make it 
possible to create on the Vistula “an opposing barrier” against Russia. At the 
same time Champagny felt that Poland itself should be used as a link in the 
traditional block for French foreign policy – Turkey, Sweden and Poland. This 
report sketched out in essence a program of diplomatic preparations for the 
war, in which the question regarding Poland was spelled out very broadly.59
In this way French government attempted to bring the Duchy of 
Warsaw into the system of European alliances directed against Russia. On 
April 24, 1810, Napoleon approved Champagny’s decision to send to Didelot, 
the French envoy in Copenhagen, a secret letter outlining the intention of 
the French emperor to create a secret alliance between Sweden, Denmark 
and the Duchy of Warsaw.60 Champagny wrote to Didelot in this regard: “Swe-
56) KUKIEL, pp. 93–98.
57) FEDOSOVA, pp. 165–167.
58)  SHILDER N. K., The Emperor Alexander I, His Life and Reign, St. Petersburg, 1898, T. 3, 
477–483.
59) Ibid., p. 482. 
60) FEDOSOVA, p. 275.
in Austrian hands, but Russia was adequately compensated with the transfer 
to her of the district of Tarnopol containing some 400,000 inhabitants.52
Napoleon had secured the Tsar’s consent to the extension of the 
Duchy of Warsaw not only by territorial compensation but also by a promise 
to guarantee to Russia the possession of her Polish provinces. Accordingly, 
immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna, the Russian Fo-
reign minister drafted a so-called “Treaty of Guarantee.” Count Rumiantsev 
declared that this treaty would reassure the Russian Empire ‘once and for 
all’ against the loss of its Polish territories through the re-establishment of 
the kingdom of Poland.53 French ambassador in St. Petersburg Caulaincourt 
gave his approval to the treaty, having earlier received instructions from 
Napoleon not to refuse any Russian proposal whose purpose was to elimina-
te the concept of the restoration of Poland; he had been informed that Russia 
must be tranquilized at all costs.54
When the “Treaty of Guarantee” reached Paris, it created conside-
rable turmoil. A period of intense diplomatic negotiations followed; three 
distinct treaties were drafted but none was ever ratifi ed. Although there was 
disagreement on practically all of the articles, Napoleon protested most vio-
lently against the fi rst. This article stated simply that “the kingdom of Poland 
will never be re-established”. “I will never agree to that which Count Rumiant-
sov demands,” protested Napoleon. He refused also to agree that the names 
Poland and Polish would never be used; such an engagement would be “ridi-
culous and absurd.” Not wishing to antagonize the Poles, Napoleon wanted 
the treaty to remain secret. The Tsar would not agree, for that would remove 
the raison d’étre (reason for existence) of the treaty. In Alexander’s opinion, 
the purpose of treaty was to put an end to all the “fanciful hopes” of the Poles 
and this is could not do if they were unaware of its existence. 55 
As the negotiations bore no fruit, they served to arouse the suspici-
ons of Alexander and to strain the relations between France and Russia. The 
Tsar could not understand why, if Napoleon had no thought of restoring Po-
land, he made one think so by permitting the use of the words “Polish Army” 
and “Poland” and thereby exciting the Poles and “disturbing the peace of 
52) PALMER, p. 234.
53) SCHILDER, II, p. 267.
54) Ibid., pp. 267–268.
55)  E. I. FEDOSOVA, The Polish Question in the External Policy of the First Empire in France, 
Moscow, 1980, p. 146. 
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independent Poland. He was interested in a Polish state only as part of the 
Russian Empire and in the “happiness” of The Poles only as Russian subjects. 
A Polish state outside of the Russian frontiers was a defi nite threat to the in-
tegrity of the Empire. Already many Poles in the Russian Polish provinces 
looked hopefully across the frontier. Thousands of them had joined the Po-
lish Legions in 1807 and other thousands entered the service of the Duchy of 
Warsaw in the campaign of 1809.65 In the event of a Franco-Russian war, 
Alexander feared he might have to contend not only with the Poles in the 
Ducal army, which was 60, 000 men, but also with the Poles in his own pro-
vinces, who might rise in revolt.66
According to Alexander Poland, constituted as the Duchy of War-
saw, could lead only a precarious existence which depended only on the per-
son of Napoleon. But Napoleon was not eternal; with his passing, the result 
could not but be disastrous for Poland. Therefore, her existence should be 
made more secure by tying her fortunes to those of Russia. Not only would 
Poland be re-established, but Europe would be delivered from the yoke of 
Napoleon.67 Consequently, he instructed Czartoryski to go to Warsaw, to con-
fer, with the necessary precautions, with the leaders of the nation and the 
army, to impart the Russian plans to them, to study their reactions, and to 
receive their engagements if they were favourably disposed. “A moment like 
this,” continued Alexander, “presents itself but once; any other plan will only 
lead to a war to the death between Russia and France, in which the unfortuna-
te theatre of operations will be your country.”68
Czartoryski, who earlier would have welcomed the creation of 
a Russian Poland with enthusiasm, now received Alexander’s proposals with 
considerable reserve. He foresaw numerous diffi  culties. He doubted the suf-
fi ciency of military means that were to be used against Napoleon. He feared 
civil war in Poland, for it would not be easy to convince the Poles that Napo-
leon should be abandoned. They would have to be off ered a state of aff airs 
preferable to that which they enjoyed. This meant, according to Czartoryski, 
an off er of the Constitution of 3 May 1791, the reunion of all of the former 
Polish territories, and adequate outlets for trade. Even then, one could not be 
65)  During the campaign of 1809 Alexander issued confi scation of property for the nobles 
and bourgeoisie who enrolled under the fl ag of Poiniatowski. See PALMER, p. 213. 
66) BOBRZYNSKI, III, p. 53. 
67) KUKIEL, p. 94.
68) Ibid., p. 96. 
den already fears Russia. Does Denmark experience the same fear? Common 
interests must force Sweden, Denmark and the Duchy of Warsaw to unite in 
a secret alliance, which can absolutely and really be guaranteed by France.”61 
At the same time, he rushed to add “all this is no more than plans.” 
Didelot did not make an offi  cial off er to the Danish government in 
this regard, but initiated it into the plans of the French emperor. However, 
the idea of the alliance was not pursued. Sweden and Denmark had no wish 
to get involved in “too big an adventure,” they feared that they would be 
saddled with specifi c obligations towards the Duchy of Warsaw, whose posi-
tion was still very precarious, dangerous and uncertain from the geographi-
cal point of view.62 It is true that in the fall of 1811, France again off ered 
a tripartite alliance. But in 1811 Napoleon’s off er was turned down again. 
Sweden preferred an alliance with Russia. 
However, this lack of success did not change Napoleon’s mind to-
wards Poland. He did not want to and could not lose the advantages that the 
Polish territories and Polish recruits could bring him in his preparations for 
a war with Russia. Moreover, already by the end of 1811, Napoleon was thin-
king how to best put to use the patriotic feelings of the Poles. In a letter to his 
step-son dated December 30, 1811, he referred to for the fi rst time in a dem-
agogic way to the new aggression being prepared, as “the Polish War”.63 As 
a whole, the problem of Poland was never really spelled out by Napoleon. In 
the military treaty between France and Prussia (February 24, 1812) this pro-
blem was not mentioned, and in the alliance treaty with Austria (March 14, 
1812) only very carefully.
In the meantime Russia also was preparing herself to the war with 
France and Poland in these plans played a very important role. As the breach 
between France and Russia became more and more probable, the Polish Que-
stion grew in importance. Within one week after announcing his withdra-
wal from the Continental System, Alexander wrote on 6 January, 1811, his 
well-known letter to Czartoryski in which he expressed the belief that the 
time had arrived to proclaim the re-establishment of Poland.64
If in the period 1806 to 1810 Alexander appeared hostile to the 
Poles and to the idea of a kingdom of Poland, it was because he opposed an 
61) Ibid., p. 278.
62) S. ASKENAZY, Na rozdrożu, Biblioteka Warszawska, 1911, p. 78–83. 
63) FEDOSOVA, p. 250.
64) Mémories de Czartorzski, II, pp. 248–254.
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to defend himself, then he should proceed at once to execute his plan by pro-
claiming the restoration of Poland under the most favourable conditions.71
During the year following Czartoryski’s report on the situation in 
the Duchy of Warsaw, the correspondence between him and Alexander stop-
ped. When it was resumed in the spring of 1812, the latter explained the re-
asons for his silence: his plans for Poland had acquired too much publicity, 
a defi nite disadvantage to them; he had received information that Czartory-
ski was being watched and did not wish to expose him to any danger; fi nally, 
he had decided to await events, since the Prince’s letter had given him little 
hope for the success of his scheme.72
Alexander inquired what would be the most appropriate time to 
announce the rebirth of Poland—should this be done at the very moment 
hostilities broke out or after the Russian armies had gained some marked 
advantages? He also sought Czartoryski’s opinion concerning the creation of 
an autonomous Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a preliminary measure to the 
revival of Poland.73
Not before the pause of more than two months did Czartoryski fi -
nally reply to Alexander’s queries. The reply was most critical and discoura-
ging. In it the Prince asserted that the creation of a Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia would have been desirable a year earlier, but that now, when “the cannons 
were about to roar,” it would be diffi  cult or almost impossible to change the 
present state of aff airs. He pointed out that, with the appearance of Napole-
on again on Polish soil, he expected “at every moment some remarkable deve-
lopment” which would probably take place even before his letter reached 
Alexander. Therefore, any “proclamations or operations” on the Tsar’s part 
would appear to be too late.74
Seemingly ignoring the advice of his former Minister, Alexander 
proceeded to Vilno, where he was entertained in grand style by the aristo-
cracy and where he made a favourable impression on the inhabitants of the 
region. It was rumoured that in the baggage of the Tsar was the crown of the 
last king of Poland. Whether or not this was true, it is a fact that a proclama-
71)  See KUKIEL, pp. 103–104, or Report dared Puławy, 12. 3. 1811, in: Grand duke Nicholas, I, 
pp. 373–79. 
72) Czartoryski to Alexander, 1. 4. 1812, Memoires de Czartoryski, II, 279–284.
73) Ibid., p. 284.
74)  Czartoryski to Alexander, 4. 6. 1812, and postscript of 13. 6. 1812. See Grand Duke Nicho-
las, I, pp. 387–392.
entirely certain that the Poles would abandon Napoleon, as they were grate-
ful to him for what he had already done; they regarded the French as close 
friends and comrades in arms, and the Russians as natural enemies; they 
would fear for the lives of the 20,000 Poles fi ghting in Spain and for their 
children in Paris; and fi nally, they still had faith in the genius of Napoleon 
to achieve victory under all circumstances.69
Czartoryski, in accordance with Alexander’s request,70 went to 
Warsaw to sound out the leading Poles on their attitude toward Russia and 
toward the new plans for Poland. Among others, he talked with Poniatowski, 
at that time Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army. 
The Polish leader rejected the overtures, and even revealed Alexander’s de-
signs to Napoleon. Czartoryski had no more success with other infl uential 
Poles. In reporting to the Tsar on his mission to Warsaw, he stated that the 
re-establishment of Poland was a universal wish among the Poles, but that 
they were not convinced; especially those in the army, that this could be 
realized by abandoning France and attaching themselves to Russia. If Russia 
was to win sympathy among the Poles, continued Czartoryski, her conduct 
must be entirely diff erent from that of the past. She must prove her goodwill 
not only to those Poles under her domination but also to those in the Duchy 
of Warsaw. Every occasion must be used to prove that Napoleon’s real inten-
tions were less generous and benefi cent than those of the Tsar. In concluding 
his report, the Prince recommended two alternatives: if Alexander did not 
intend to open hostilities, he should use the time to court the Poles both in 
Russia and in the Duchy of Warsaw; if he took the off ensive or was compelled 
69) Czartoryski to Alexander, 30. 1. 1811, Mémoires de Czartoryski, II, pp. 255–270.
70)  Alexander wrote another, much longer letter to Czartoryski. In it he promised that the 
proclamation of Poland’s re-establishment should precede all other events. The new king-
dom would include all of the former Polish territories, with her frontier at the line of the 
Dvina, the Beresina, and the Dnieper. An attempt would be made to persuade Austria to 
give up Galicia in exchange for Moldavia and Wallachia. Being unfamiliar with the 3 May 
Constitution, Alexander could not promise the Poles that particular charter, but he as-
sured Czartoryski that it would be a liberal one. Commerce would be revived, misery abol-
ished and taxes reduced. Again he cited numerous fi gures to prove that if the Poles sup-
ported him, his military forces would be more numerous than those of Napoleon and that 
he would be able to reach the Oder “without striking a blow.” Thus the co-operation of the 
Poles was essential, and until Alexander was certain of their unanimous support he was 
determined not to open hostilities with France. Mémoires de Czartoryski,, II, pp. 271–278.
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pectations rose feverishly. A number of magnates, fearful of social disor-
der, continued to support Alexander.77
The Poles in the Napoleonic Grande Armée numbered almost 
100,000 men. Thirty-fi ve thousand of them were concentrated in the Fifth 
Polish Corps under General Poniatowski. Poles also during the march into 
Russia played a very important role in the military operations. Polish lan-
cers were the fi rst to swim the Niemen and carry the tricolor onto Russian 
territory. Umiński’s dragoons were the fi rst into Moscow. Poniatowski’s Fifth 
Corps played a crucial role at Borodino: the Chevaux-Légers78 saved 
Napoleon’s life from a pack of marauding Cossacks; Poniatowski covered the 
whole retreat and defended the Berezina crossings. Polish units were the 
fi rst in and the last out of Russia; 72,000 never returned, and many more 
died of wounds or typhus in the following months. Yet they did not abandon 
a single fi eld-gun or standard to the enemy in the whole retreat.79 As the rem-
nants of the Grande Armée streamed westwards and Napoleon rushed to 
Paris, the Duchy of Warsaw was left defenceless. Dąbrowski’s division follo-
wed the French army into Germany, but Poniatowski fell back on Cracow 
with 16,000 men. 
In the meantime, Czartoryski, now realizing with the retreat of 
Napoleon that the Tsar was the only hope of his countrymen, urged Alexan-
der to revert to his original scheme for Poland instead of taking vengeance.80 
He even prepared and transmitted to the Tsar a draft of a constitution for his 
country. Further, he suggested that an independent Poland be created under 
the Tsar’s youngest brother, the Grand Duke Michael Pavlovich.81
In his reply, Alexander summarized his attitude toward the Polish 
Question and the diffi  culties with which he had to contend. He pointed out 
fi rst of all that his success had in no way altered either his sentiments or his 
intentions toward Poland. “Her people need not fear vengeance, for this was 
77) FEDOSOVA, pp. 255–264.
78)  The Chevau-légers (from French cheval-horse and léger-light) was French light cavalry, 
roughly similar to lancers in the armies of other states during the Napoleonic Wars. Per-
haps the most famous of all such units were the Polish 1st Light Cavalry Regiment of the 
Guards and the Polish 3rd Light Cavalry Regiment. J. L. PACHOŃSKI, Legiony polskie. Praw-
da i legenda, Warszawa 1969, vol. II., pp. 201–205.
79) Ibid., pp. 265–274.
80) Czartoryski to Alexander, 27. 12. 1812, in Memoires de Czartoryski, II, pp. 298–302.
81) KUKIEL, pp. 102–103.
tion, which was to be read by Alexander at the outbreak of hostilities, had 
been drafted. After showering the Poles with praise for their heroism and 
patriotism, the message concluded with the following words: “I declare in 
the name of heaven and earth that I restore the Kingdom of Poland, to include 
the Duchy of Warsaw and all of the Polish provinces and territories which, 
following the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1796, were annexed to Russia; that 
in the name of God, I place upon my head the royal Polish crown, separated 
from the imperial Russian crown, but united in my person with Russia; that 
I regard as the fundamental law of the Polish people the Third of May consti-
tution, which is beloved and respected by all of you; and I propose to govern 
you in accordance with it.”75
Just when celebrations were at their height, during a ball given by 
the Tsar in General Benningsen’s palace, news reached Alexander that Napole-
on had crossed the Niemen. Twenty-four hours later not a single nobleman’s car-
riage was to be found in Wilno. Two days afterwards, Napoleon appeared in 
the Lithuanian capital. When Alexander issued his stirring war proclamation 
to the Russian troops, he called upon them to defend their “religion, country, 
and independence.”76 Not one word was said of the Poles, for he knew the Rus-
sians would die for their fatherland but not for Poland.
Poland and the War of 1812
The year 1812 made new diffi  culties and changes in the policy of bellige-
rent Powers. The Russian Campaign was just another act of political domi-
nation on the Continent for the French. For the Russians, it presented the 
supreme test for the integrity and durability of their Empire. For the Poles 
alone, it was a war of liberation. When the Grande Armée crossed the Nie-
men on 24 June, most of its soldiers were aware only that they were cros-
sing the frontier of the Russian Empire. But the thousands of Poles among 
them were more conscious that they were crossing the historic frontier of 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As they tramped towards Wilno, they knew 
that they were destroying the barrier which had kept the two parts of the 
old Republic apart for the last twenty years. On the Lithuanian side, ex-
75) SCHILDER, p. 256. or KUKIEL, pp. 178–189.
76) KUKIEL, pp. 110–115.
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them (so-called Kalisz and Reichenbach treaties).85 Similarly, at the Congress 
of Vienna, Alexander fi nally had to be content with less than the whole of the 
Duchy of Warsaw if the recurrence of war, this time among the allies them-
selves, was to be averted.
 Throughout the spring and summer of 1813 those who had remai-
ned on the Russian side tried to induce Poniatowski and his army to cast off  
their loyalty to Napoleon and place itself at Alexander’s disposal. Poniatow-
ski, however, had the strictest sense of personal honour. He rejected the Rus-
sian proposals and led his army off  to rejoin Napoleon in Germany. On 19 
October, the last day of the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig, the heavily woun-
ded prince died while trying to swim the river Elster when the French, who-
se retreat he was covering, blew up the bridges. 
Nevertheless, the Poles continued to follow Napoleon. When Napo-
leon went into exile on the island of Elba, half of the symbolic guard he was 
allowed were Polish Chevaux Légers. Alexander, on the other hand, did suc-
ceed later in creating a small Kingdom of Poland in “personal union” with the 
Russian Empire (1815).86 Enjoying a liberal constitution, their own fl ag, army 
and language, the majority of the Poles in the “Congress Kingdom,” as it came 
to be called, were grateful to the restorer of their fatherland. Only the perver-
sion of Alexander’s principles in the government of Poland by Russian of-
fi cials made the position of the Poles insecure, precarious and intolerable.
85)  In the Treaty of Kalisz with Prussia (28. 2. 1813; see Martens, VII, 62–81) Alexander promised 
not to lay down his arms until Prussia was reconstituted proportionally as of 1806. Further, 
Alexander guaranteed to Prussia her present possessions, including East Prussia, to which 
was to be joined suffi  cient territory to serve as a tie between East Prussia and Silesia. Such 
a link could be established at the expense of the Duchy of Warsaw. See KUKIEL, p. 104; In the 
Treaty of Reichenbach (27. 6. 1813) it was agreed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia that Duchy 
of Warsaw was to be dissolved and partitioned among the three powers according to ar-
rangements made by them without the intervention of France. KUKIEL, pp. 114–118.
86)  See S. ASKENAZY, Polska a Europa, 1813–1815, Biblioteka Warszawska, 1909, pp. 1–30, 
209–237. or C. K. WEBSTER, The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815, London 1918.
a sentiment which was unknown to him and his greatest pleasure was to re-
pay evil with good.” Already he had announced a general amnesty in order to 
prove to the Poles that they will never fi nd anywhere greater happiness and 
security than in uniting with powerful and generous Russia, and he had gi-
ven the strictest orders to the Russian generals to treat the Poles as friends 
and brothers.82 Alexander confessed that there were certain diffi  culties 
which he had to overcome despite the apparent “splendor of his position.” 
Public opinion in Russia was one of them. The conduct of the Polish army in 
Russia its sack of Smolensk, and of Moscow, and its devastation of the whole 
country had revived old hatreds. The other was the attitude of Austria and 
Prussia. An attempt to carry out his plans toward Poland “would throw Au-
stria and Prussia completely into the arms of France.”83
These were the two principal obstacles which were to stand in the 
way of the attainment of Alexander’s Polish plans, and which explain their but 
partial fulfi llment at the Congress of Vienna. Because of Russian opinion, Alex-
ander could not accept Czartoryski’s proposal for an independent Poland under 
the Grand Duke Michael. He wrote to Czartoryski: “Do not forget that Lithuania, 
Podolia, and Voihynia have till now regarded themselves as Russian provinces, 
and that no logic in the world will be able to persuade Russia to see them under 
the domination of any other sovereign than the one who rules Russia.”84
As long as the war continued and the fi nal provisions of the peace 
settlement were not determined, the wishes of the other great powers had to 
be considered. During the summer of 1812, Austria and Prussia supported 
Napoleon. Alexander won them over to the allied side only after long negot-
iations and by avoiding any reference to his Polish plans. The treaties with 
Austria and Prussia provided indirectly for the return of Polish territories to 
82) Ibid., pp. 103–104
83) KUKIEL. p. 104.
84) Czartoryski to Alexander, 1. 4. 1812, Memoires de Czartoryski, II, 279–284.
